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The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem establishes the impossibility of a noncontextual hidden vari-
able model of quantum theory, or equivalently, that quantum theory is contextual. In this paper,
an operational definition of contextuality is introduced which generalizes the standard notion in
three ways: (1) it applies to arbitrary operational theories rather than just quantum theory, (2)
it applies to arbitrary experimental procedures rather than just sharp measurements, and (3) it
applies to a broad class of ontological models of quantum theory rather than just deterministic
hidden variable models. We derive three no-go theorems for ontological models, each based on an
assumption of noncontextuality for a different sort of experimental procedure; one for preparation
procedures, another for unsharp measurement procedures (that is, measurement procedures associ-
ated with positive-operator valued measures), and a third for transformation procedures. All three
proofs apply to two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and are therefore stronger than traditional proofs
of contextuality.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a noncontextual hidden variable model
of quantum theory is one wherein the measurement out-
come that occurs for a particular set of values of the
hidden variables depends only on the Hermitian opera-
tor associated with the measurement and not on which
Hermitian operators are measured simultaneously with
it. For instance, suppose A,B and C are Hermitian op-
erators such that A and B commute, A and C commute,
but B and C do not commute. Then the assumption of
noncontextuality is that the value predicted to occur in
a measurement of A does not depend on whether B or C
was measured simultaneously. The Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem shows that a hidden variable model of quantum
theory that is noncontextual in this sense is impossible
for Hilbert spaces of dimension three or greater [1, 2].
The traditional definition of noncontextuality is lack-
ing in several respects: (1) it does not apply to an ar-
bitrary physical theory, but is rather specific to quan-
tum theory; (2) it does not apply to unsharp measure-
ments, that is, those associated with positive-operator
valued measures (POVMs), nor does it apply to prepa-
ration or transformation procedures; and (3) it does not
apply to ontological models wherein the outcomes of mea-
surements are determined only probabilistically from the
complete physical state of the system under investiga-
tion, for instance, indeterministic hidden variable models
or ontological models of quantum theory lacking hidden
variables. In this paper, we propose a new definition:
A noncontextual ontological model of an op-
erational theory is one wherein if two exper-
imental procedures are operationally equiv-
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alent, then they have equivalent representa-
tions in the ontological model.
This definition will be explained in section II of this
article, where we provide a precise account of what it
is for two experimental procedures to be operationally
equivalent, and describe what is meant by an ontologi-
cal model of an operational theory, specifying in particu-
lar how different experimental procedures (preparations,
measurements and transformations) are represented in
such a model. We also explain why it is appropriate
to call this sort of ontological model noncontextual by
providing an operational definition of an experimental
context.
In section III, we specialize our definition to the case
of quantum theory. We provide examples of the sorts of
contexts that can arise for preparations, transformations
and measurements, and describe what an assumption of
noncontextuality for each type of procedure implies for
an ontological model of quantum theory. In the case of
measurements, we also generalize the object that is ex-
amined for context-dependence from outcomes to proba-
bilities of outcomes, and discuss the motivation for doing
so. Further, we show how the traditional notion of non-
contextuality is subsumed as a special case of our gener-
alized notion when the outcomes of sharp measurements
are assumed to be uniquely determined by the complete
physical state of the system under investigation.
In sections IV, V, and VI, we provide no-go theorems
for ontological models based on the assumption of non-
contextuality for preparations, unsharp measurements,
and transformations, respectively. All three proofs apply
to two-dimensional (2d) Hilbert spaces, and are there-
fore stronger than traditional no-go theorems for non-
contextuality, which require Hilbert spaces of dimension
2three or greater1. In section V, we also provide a no-go
theorem for noncontextuality of unsharp measurements
based on a recent generalization of Gleason’s theorem to
2d Hilbert spaces [5, 6]. Section VII provides a general
discussion of the motivation and plausibility of noncon-
textuality for different sorts of procedures, and section
VIII investigates the connection between these different
sorts of noncontextuality and the assumption that mea-
surement outcomes are uniquely determined by the com-
plete physical state of the system under investigation.
Some conclusions and questions for future research are
presented in section IX.
II. DEFINITIONS OF NONCONTEXTUALITY
FOR ANY OPERATIONAL THEORY
In an operational interpretation of a physical theory,
the primitive elements are preparation procedures, trans-
formation procedures, and measurement procedures.
These are understood as lists of instructions to be im-
plemented in the laboratory. The role of an operational
theory is merely to specify the probabilities p(k|P,T,M)
of different outcomes k that may result from a measure-
ment procedure M given a particular preparation pro-
cedure P, and a particular transformation procedure T.
When there is no transformation procedure, or when it
is considered to be part of the preparation or the mea-
surement, we have simply p(k|P,M).
Given the rule for determining probabilities of out-
comes, one can define a notion of equivalence among
experimental procedures. Specifically, two preparation
procedures are deemed equivalent if they yield the same
long-run statistics for every possible measurement proce-
dure, that is, P is equivalent to P′ if
p(k|P,M) = p(k|P′,M) for all M. (1)
Two measurement procedures are deemed equivalent if
they yield the same long-run statistics for every possible
preparation procedure, that is, M is equivalent to M′ if
their outcomes can be associated one-to-one such that
p(k|P,M) = p(k|P,M′) for all P. (2)
Finally, two transformation procedures are deemed
equivalent if they yield the same long-run statistics for
every possible preparation procedure that may precede
and every possible measurement procedure that may fol-
low, that is, T is equivalent to T′ if
p(k|P,T,M) = p(k|P,T′,M) for all P,M. (3)
1 Recent work by Cabello [4] generalizes the notion of contextual-
ity to unsharp measurements in a manner that is different from
the proposal of this paper. From our perspective, this work
makes use of an assumption of deterministic outcomes for un-
sharp measurements that cannot be justified by an assumption
of noncontextuality. This issue is discussed in section VIII.
It follows that one can distinguish two types of features
of an experimental procedure: the first type of feature is
one that is specified by specifying the equivalence class
that the procedure falls in, while the second type is one
that is not. The set of features of the second type – those
that are not specified by specifying the equivalence class
– we call the context of the experimental procedure. Note
that by our definition of an experimental context having
knowledge of the context does not enable one to predict
the outcome of an experiment any better than if one only
knew the equivalence class of the experimental procedure.
An example from quantum theory should clarify the
notion of a context. Consider the following different mea-
surement procedures for photon polarization. The first,
which we denote by M1, constitutes a piece of polaroid
oriented to pass light that is vertically polarized along
the zˆ axis, followed by a photodetector. The second,
which we denote by M2, constitutes a birefringent crys-
tal oriented to separate light that is vertically polarized
along the zˆ axis from light that is horizontally polarized
along this axis, followed by a photodetector in the verti-
cally polarized output. The third and fourth procedures,
denoted M3 and M4 are identical to M1 and M2 respec-
tively, except that they are defined relative to an axis nˆ
that is skew to the zˆ axis. It turns out that the statistics
of outcomes for M1 are the same as those for M2, for all
preparation procedures, and those for M3 are the same
as those for M4. However, the statistics of outcomes for
the first pair are different from those of the second. Thus,
M1 and M2 fall in one equivalence class of measurements,
and M3 and M4 fall in another. The orientation of the
polaroid or calcite crystal is an example of the first sort
of feature of an experimental operation, one whose vari-
ation involves a variation in the operational equivalence
class of the procedure. On the other hand, whether one
uses a piece of polaroid or a birefringent crystal to mea-
sure photon polarization is a feature of the measurement
procedure of the second type; a variation of this feature
does not change the equivalence class of the procedure.
It is therefore part of the context of the measurement
procedure.
To properly define a noncontextual ontological model
of an operational theory, it is not enough to have a defi-
nition of context; we also need to specify precisely what
we mean by an ontological model. We turn to this now.
An ontological model is an attempt to offer an explana-
tion of the success of an operational theory by assuming
that there exist physical systems that are the subject of
the experiment. These systems are presumed to have at-
tributes regardless of whether they are being subjected to
experimental test, and regardless of what anyone knows
about them. These attributes describe the real state of
affairs of the system. Thus, a specification of which in-
stance of each attribute applies at a given time we call
the ontic state of the system. If the ontic state is not
completely specified after specifying the preparation pro-
cedure, then the additional variables required to specify
it are called hidden variables. Although most ontologi-
3cal models do involve hidden variables, this is not always
the case. For instance, the ontic states may be associ-
ated one-to-one with the equivalence classes of prepara-
tion procedures (as is the case for pure preparation pro-
cedures in the Beltrametti-Bugajski model of quantum
theory [8]). We shall denote the complete set of variables
in an ontological model by λ, and the space of values of
λ by Ω.
Within an ontological model of an operational the-
ory, preparation procedures are preparations of the ontic
state of the system. However, the procedure need not fix
this state uniquely; rather, it might only fix the probabil-
ities that the system be in different ontic states. Thus,
someone who knows that a system was prepared using
the preparation procedure P describes the system by a
probability density µP(λ) over the model variables.
Similarly, measurement procedures are measurements
of the ontic state of the system. Again, these proce-
dures need not enable one to infer the identity of the
ontic state uniquely, nor need they even enable one to
infer a set of ontic states within which the actual on-
tic state lies. Rather, they might only enable one to infer
probabilities for the system to have been in different ontic
states. In this, the most general case, the outcome of the
measurement is not uniquely determined by λ. Only the
probabilities of the different outcomes are so determined.
Thus, for every value of λ, one associates a probability
ξM,k(λ) which is the probability of obtaining outcome k
in a measurement M given that the system is in the ontic
state λ. We call ξM,k(λ) an “indicator function”
2.
Finally, transformation procedures are transformations
of the ontic state of the system. These may be stochas-
tic transitions. Thus, a transformation procedure T is
represented by a transition matrix, ΓT(λ
′, λ), which rep-
resents the probability density for a transition from the
ontic state λ to the ontic state λ′.
Thus, within an ontological model, if the prepara-
tion procedure is P, and the measurement procedure
is M, then the probability assigned to outcome k is
the probability assigned to outcome k given λ, aver-
aged over all λ, weighted by the probability of λ, that
is,
∫
dλµP(λ)ξM,k(λ). If there is a transformation pro-
cedure T intervening between the preparation and mea-
surement, and this is associated with the transition ma-
2 Some might argue that within the framework of an ontological
model, the term measurement ought to be reserved for a proce-
dure which reveals some attribute of the system under investiga-
tion. However, we feel that it is suitable for any procedure that
leads to an update in one’s information about which instance
of some attribute applied, or equivalently, in one’s information
about what the ontic state of the system was prior to the pro-
cedure being implemented. Note that even this weak notion of
what constitutes a measurement fails for some experimental pro-
cedures that lead to distinct outcomes, namely, those wherein
the probabilities of the different outcomes are independent of
the ontic state. For simplicity however, we shall not introduce
any novel terminology for this exceptional case.
trix ΓT(λ
′, λ), then the probability of outcome k is∫
dλ′dλ ξM,k(λ′) ΓT(λ′, λ) µP(λ).
Summarizing, an ontological model assumes: (1) every
preparation procedure P is associated with a normalized
probability density over the ontic state space, µP : Ω →
[0, 1] such that
∫
µP(λ)dλ = 1; (2) every measurement
procedure M with outcomes labelled by k is associated
with a set of indicator functions {ξM,k(λ)}k over the on-
tic states, that is, a set of functions ξM,k : Ω → [0, 1]
satisfying
∑
k ξM,k(λ) = 1 for all λ; (3) every transfor-
mation procedure T is associated with a transition matrix
ΓT : Ω × Ω → [0, 1] such that
∫
ΓT(λ
′, λ)dλ′ = 1 for all
λ, and (4) the predictions of the operational theory are
reproduced exactly by the model, that is,
p(k|P,T,M) =
∫
dλ′dλ ξM,k(λ′) ΓT(λ′, λ) µP(λ) (4)
for all P , T, and M.
In general, the representation of an experimental pro-
cedure in an ontological model might depend on both its
equivalence class and its context.3 It is natural, how-
ever, to consider the possibility of a model wherein the
representation of every experimental procedure depends
only on its equivalence class and not on its context. Af-
ter all, a natural way to explain the fact that a pair
of preparation (measurement,transformation) procedures
are operationally equivalent is to assume that they pre-
pare (measure,transform) the ontic state of the system
in precisely the same way. We shall call such an onto-
logical model noncontextual. Any operational theory
that admits such a model shall also be called noncontex-
tual4. In general, if any set of procedures is represented in
a context-independent way within an ontological model,
we shall say that the model is noncontextual for those
procedures.
It is useful to explicitly characterize the assumption of
noncontextuality for preparations, transformations, and
measurements. We will call an ontological model prepa-
ration noncontextual if the representation of every prepa-
ration procedure is independent of context, that is, if
µP(λ) = µe(P)(λ) (5)
where e(P) is P’s equivalence class. Similarly, we will
call a model measurement noncontextual if the represen-
tation of every measurement procedure is independent of
context, that is, if
ξM,k(λ) = ξe(M),k(λ) (6)
3 If one allows such generality, then – perhaps contrary to a com-
mon impression – it is possible to provide an ontological model of
quantum theory. The deBroglie-Bohm theory [9] is an example.
4 This terminology allows one to use the phrase ”quantum theory is
contextual” as a shorthand for ”quantum theory does not admit
a noncontextual ontological model”, much as it is common to use
the phrase ”quantum theory is nonlocal” in place of ”quantum
theory does not admit a local ontological model”.
4where e(M) is M’s equivalence class. Finally, a model
is called transformation noncontextual if the representa-
tion of every transformation procedure is independent of
context, that is, if
ΓT(λ
′, λ) = Γe(T)(λ′, λ) (7)
where e(T) is T’s equivalence class. A universally non-
contextual ontological model is one that is noncontextual
for all experimental procedures: preparations, transfor-
mations, and measurements.
III. DEFINITIONS OF NONCONTEXTUALITY
IN QUANTUM THEORY
We begin with a quick review of the operational ap-
proach to quantum theory, described, for instance, in
Refs. [10, 11, 12, 13].
An equivalence class of preparation procedures is as-
sociated with a density operator ρ. This is a positive
trace-1 operator over the Hilbert space H of the system:
ρ > 0, Tr(ρ) = 1. Rank-1 density operators are simply
projectors onto rays of Hilbert space, and are called pure.
An equivalence class of measurement procedures is
associated with a positive operator valued measure
(POVM) {Ek}. A POVM is an ordered set {Ek} of pos-
itive operators that sum to identity,
∑
k Ek = I. The
kth element, Ek, is associated with the kth outcome.
Specifically, given a preparation associated with a den-
sity operator ρ, the probability of the outcome k is simply
Tr(ρEk). It is useful to single out the POVMs whose ele-
ments are idempotent, that is, those for which E2k = Ek
for all k. Since idempotent positive operators are pro-
jectors, these POVMs are called projective-valued mea-
sures (PVMs). The associated measurements are said to
be sharp. These are the sorts of measurements that are
considered in standard textbook treatments of quantum
mechanics. A Hermitian operator defines a PVM through
the projectors in its spectral resolution.
Finally, an equivalence class of transformation proce-
dures is associated with a completely positive (CP) map
T . A CP map T is a positive linear map on the space
of operators over H such that T ⊗ I is a positive linear
map on the space of operators over H ⊗ H′, where H′
is of arbitrary dimension, and I is the identity map on
H′. Unitary maps, familiar from textbook treatments of
quantum theory, are reversible CP maps.
A preparation procedure associated with a non-rank-
1 density operator ρ can be implemented in as many
ways as there are convex decompositions of ρ. Sup-
pose {(pk, ρk)} is a convex decomposition of ρ, that is,
ρ =
∑
k pkρk. If one generates a random number accord-
ing to the distribution pk, and upon obtaining the num-
ber k, one implements the preparation associated with
ρk, this procedure is a member of the equivalence class
of procedures associated with ρ. Another way of imple-
menting a preparation procedure that is associated with
ρ is to implement a preparation of a purification |ψ〉 of ρ
on H⊗H′ (a purification of ρ is any state |ψ〉 such that
TrH′ |ψ〉 〈ψ| = ρ). The equivalence class therefore also
contains members associated with different purifications
of ρ.
The assumption of preparation noncontextuality in
quantum theory is that the probability distribution over
ontic states that is associated with a preparation proce-
dure P depends only on the density operator ρ associated
with P,
µP(λ) = µρ(λ). (8)
In particular, the distribution does not depend on the
particular convex decomposition of ρ or on the particu-
lar purification of ρ that is used in the preparation pro-
cedure.
The multiplicity of contexts for transformation pro-
cedures parallels the multiplicity of contexts for prepa-
ration procedures. Transformation procedures that are
associated with non-unitary CP maps can be obtained
as a convex sum of unitary maps in many different ways,
each one of which corresponds to a distinct transforma-
tion procedure, and can also be obtained by implement-
ing a unitary map on a larger system that incorporates
the system of interest [14].
The assumption of transformation noncontextuality in
quantum theory is that the transition matrix that is asso-
ciated with a given transformation procedure T depends
only on the CP map T associated with T,
ΓT(λ
′, λ) = ΓT (λ′, λ). (9)
It does not, for instance, depend on the particular convex
sum of unitaries or the particular unitary on a larger
system by which the transformation was implemented.
In the case of quantum measurements, there are also
many sorts of contexts. For instance, every fine-graining
of a non-maximally informative measurement (i.e. a mea-
surement associated with a POVM at least one element
of which is not rank-1) provides a different context. Sup-
pose the POVM {Fj} is a fine-graining of {Ek}, which
is to say that there is a partitioning of the outcomes j
into sets Sk such that Ek =
∑
j∈Sk Fj . By implementing
a measurement associated with the POVM {Fj}, then
discarding all information about j except the set Sk to
which it belongs, one implements a measurement in the
equivalence class associated with the POVM {Ek}.
Despite the fact that the independence of represen-
tation on fine-graining is traditionally the full extent of
the assumption of noncontextuality for measurements (as
we will show below), it is not difficult to see that there
are many other sorts of contexts. For instance, there
is a context for every convex decomposition of a non-
maximal measurement. A convex decomposition of a
POVM {Ek} is defined as a probability distribution {pα}
and a set of POVMs, {Fα} where Fα = {Fαk }, such
that Ek =
∑
α pαF
α
k . By sampling α from the distri-
bution {pα}, then implementing the measurement asso-
ciated with the POVM {Fαk }, and registering only the
5outcome of this measurement, one implements a measure-
ment in the equivalence class associated with the POVM
{Ek}. There is also a context for every way of obtaining
a POVM by coupling to an ancilla and measuring a PVM
on the composite of system+ancilla [15].
The assumption of measurement noncontextuality in
quantum theory is that the set of indicator functions rep-
resenting a measurement M depends only on the POVM
{Ek} associated with M,
ξM,k(λ) = ξ{Ek},k(λ). (10)
In addition to admitting new sorts of contexts for mea-
surements, our generalized notion of measurement con-
textuality involves a slight revision of what it is that de-
pends on the measurement context.
In the past, measurement contextuality has only been
considered within the framework of deterministic hidden
variable theories, and the question of interest has been
whether or not the measurement outcome for a given on-
tic state of the system depends on the context of the
measurement. However, for objectively indeterministic
ontological models, it is clear that the natural question
to ask is whether the probabilities of different outcomes
for a given ontic state of the system depend on the con-
text. This is analogous to Bell’s [16] generalization of
the notion of locality from measurement outcomes be-
ing causally independent of parameter settings at space-
like separation to the probabilities of measurement out-
comes being causally independent of parameter settings
at space-like separation5. This distinction was intro-
duced by Bell in order to cleanly separate the notion of
locality from the notion of determinism. Similarly, our
generalized definition allows one to cleanly separate the
notion of measurement noncontextuality from the notion
of determinism.
Once the question is posed, it is somewhat obvious that
if there is to be any notion of measurement contextual-
ity within objectively indeterministic ontological mod-
els, the appropriate quantities to examine for context-
dependence are the probabilities of different outcomes for
a given ontic state of the system. A less obvious feature
of our generalized notion of measurement contextuality
is that the probabilities of outcomes are the appropri-
ate quantities to examine for context-dependence even in
objectively deterministic ontological models. The key is
that the latter sort of model may still exhibit an epis-
temic indeterminism, wherein knowledge of the equiv-
alence class of the measurement together with the ontic
5 More specifically, Bell [16] defined a theory to be locally deter-
ministic if the variables in space-time region I are determined by
the variables in a space-time region that fully closes the backward
light-cone of I, and locally causal if the probability distribution
over values for a variable in space-time region I are determined by
a specification of the values of all the variables in the backward
light-cone of I (“determined” in the sense that further condition-
ing on variables in the region outside the backward light-cone
would not change the probability distribution).
state of the system under investigation does not uniquely
fix the outcome. To explain this properly, we need to
consider some of the details of the mathematical repre-
sentation of these measurements.
The distinction between the ontic state of the system
determining the outcome and determining only the prob-
abilities of different outcomes is captured mathematically
within an ontological model by the sorts of indicator func-
tions one uses to represent measurements. The former
case is represented by an indicator function that is idem-
potent, that is, one for which χ(λ)2 = χ(λ) (we shall de-
note idempotent indicator functions by χ(λ) rather than
ξ(λ)). Such functions are necessarily equal to one in some
region of the ontic state space and zero elsewhere. By
virtue of the fact that a set of indicator functions must
satisfy
∑
k χk(λ) = 1, if all the indicator functions are
idempotent, then the latter must be nonoverlapping, that
is, χk(λ)χk′ (λ) = 0 for k 6= k′. Thus, for every value of
λ, only a single indicator function in the set {χk(λ)} re-
ceives the value 1 while the others receive the value 0.
Since the value of the kth indicator function at a given
λ specifies the probability of the kth outcome given the
ontic state λ , the outcome of the measurement is de-
termined for all ontic states if and only if the latter is
represented by a set of idempotent indicator functions.
We shall call the assumption that a particular mea-
surement is represented by a set of idempotent indica-
tor functions the assumption of outcome determinism for
that measurement.
Now note that even within an objectively determinis-
tic ontological model, measurements may fail to exhibit
outcome determinism: specifying the ontic state of the
system under investigation together with the equivalence
class of the measurement procedure may be insufficient
to uniquely fix the outcome. The outcome might only be
fixed uniquely by supplementary features of the measure-
ment procedure (which constitute part of the context of
the measurement by our definition), such as microscopic
degrees of freedom of the apparatus. Because the indica-
tor function for a measurement specifies the dependence
of the outcome on the ontic state of the system under
investigation, and not the dependence of the outcome on
the ontic state of any systems that make up the measure-
ment apparatus or the environment, such a measurement
must be represented by a non-idempotent set of indicator
functions. Nonetheless, it may still be the case that for
each equivalence class of measurements, all the elements
of the class are represented by the same non-idempotent
set of indicator functions, and this is all that is required
for the measurements to be deemed noncontextual by our
definition.
As an example, consider a classical system and a clas-
sical measurement device that generates an outcome by
rolling one of several differently weighted dice, with the
choice of the dice being determined by the ontic state of
the system. Two such devices are only found to be oper-
ationally equivalent if all of the dice of one are weighted
in the same way as those of the other. Thus, every device
6in the equivalence class is represented by the same set of
indicator functions, and consequently one has measure-
ment noncontextuality by our definition. The underly-
ing ontological model (classical mechanics) is objectively
deterministic, but in order to predict the outcome of a
particular measurement, one must supplement the ontic
state of the system by the precise initial configuration of
the dice and their environment, features that form part
of the context of the measurement. Thus, although the
outcome of the measurement clearly depends on the con-
text, we take this to be a failure of outcome determinism
rather than a failure of measurement noncontextuality6.
Thus, it is really the notion of outcome determinism,
rather than the notion of determinism, which we seek to
cleanly separate from the notion of measurement noncon-
textuality through our generalized definition. This makes
our definition of measurement noncontextuality revision-
ist insofar as the traditional definition implicitly incor-
porated the assumption of outcome determinism, while
ours does not. This suggested revision in terminology is
motivated by the idea that what is crucial to the notion
of a noncontextual ontological model is that it reproduces
the equivalence class structure of the operational theory.
It is worth noting that, given the additional assump-
tion of outcome determinism, one can recover the tradi-
tional definition of measurement noncontextuality as a
special case of our definition. Specifically, if one consid-
ers only sharp measurements and one represents these by
sets of idempotent functions (i.e. one assumes outcome
determinism for these measurements), then the assump-
tion of the independence of the representation of a mea-
surement on the fine-graining of the PVM with which it
is implemented is just the traditional notion of noncon-
textuality (described in the introduction). This can be
seen as follows. Specifying whether a Hermitian operator
A is measured together with B or with C is equivalent
to specifying a fine-graining of the PVM {Pk} that is
defined by the spectral resolution of A; the simultane-
ous eigenspaces of A and B define one such fine-graining,
while the simultaneous eigenspaces of A and C define
another. Specifying the eigenvalue assigned to an oper-
ator A for every value of λ is equivalent to specifying
a set of idempotent indicator functions; the values of λ
in the support of the function associated with outcome
k are simply those that assign the kth eigenvalue to A.
Clearly then, assuming that the value assigned to A is
independent of whether A is measured together with B
or C is equivalent to assuming that the set of idempo-
tent indicator functions associated with the PVM {Pk}
is independent of the fine-graining by which it was im-
plemented.
6 By our definition, any classical theory is necessarily noncontex-
tual for all experimental procedures. This highlights another
virtue of our particular definition: contextuality, in all of its
manifestations, is found to be a nonclassical phenomenon. For
an opposing perspective, see Ref. [17].
No-go theorems based on the traditional definition of
noncontextuality apply only in Hilbert spaces of dimen-
sionality three or greater. Moreover, one cannot extend
such proofs to 2d Hilbert spaces because there are no
fine-grainings of non-trivial PVM measurements in a 2d
Hilbert space, and fine-graining is the only notion of con-
text that is recognized traditionally. However, by ap-
pealing to preparations, transformations, and unsharp
measurements, which admit many contexts even in a 2d
Hilbert space, proofs of contextuality can be achieved
here as well. From this perspective, the restriction of
previous proofs of contextuality to 3d Hilbert spaces was
an artifact of a limited notion of a context.
Among the new proofs of contextuality that we shall
present, the proof of preparation contextuality is the sim-
plest, and so we begin with this case.
IV. PROOF OF PREPARATION
CONTEXTUALITY IN 2D
There are two features of the representation of prepa-
ration procedures in an ontological model that are central
to our proof. The first concerns distinguishability, and
the second convex combination.
Feature 1 If two preparation procedures, P and P′ are dis-
tinguishable with certainty in a single-shot measurement,
then their associated probability distributions, µ(λ) and
µ′(λ), are nonoverlapping, that is,
µ(λ)µ′(λ) = 0 for all λ. (11)
This feature can be understood as follows. Suppose
one wishes to perform a measurement that discriminates,
with certainty, between two probability distributions. In
other words, one wishes to perform a measurement that
allows one to retrodict, with certainty, which distribu-
tion applied. This is only possible if the distributions to
be discriminated are nonoverlapping. The reason is that
if the two distributions overlapped in some region of the
space of ontic states, then whenever the actual ontic state
was in that region (and it will sometimes be in that re-
gion, because the region is assigned nonzero probability
by both distributions), no measurement would be able to
distinguish with certainty whether the system had been
prepared using one or the other distribution, since the ac-
tual ontic state is consistent with both. Thus, if, within
an operational theory, a pair of preparation procedures
are distinguishable with certainty, then the only way an
ontological model of the theory can account for this fact
is by associating these procedures with nonoverlapping
distribution functions.
The second feature of an ontological model that is crit-
ical to our proof is the manner in which convex combina-
tions of preparation procedures are represented. Suppose
that the preparation procedures P and P′ are represented
by distributions µ(λ) and µ′(λ). Now suppose that a bit
is generated uniformly at random from the distribution
7p, 1− p, and the value of the bit is used to determine
whether P or P′ is implemented, after which the bit is
forgotten. This effective procedure, which we call P′′,
must be represented within the ontological model by a
distribution µ′′(λ) satisfying
µ′′(λ) = pµ(λ) + (1− p)µ′(λ). (12)
The reason is as follows. The probability that the ontic
state of the system is λ given procedure P′′, is simply the
sum of the probability that it is λ given procedure P and
the probability that it is λ given procedure P′, weighted
by the respective probabilities of P and P′ given P′′.
Thus, we have:
Feature 2 A convex combination of preparation proce-
dures is represented within an ontological model by a
convex sum of the associated probability distributions.
With these facts in hand, we now proceed with the
proof.
Consider a set of six pure preparations, denoted
Pa,PA,Pb,PB,Pc, and PC , corresponding to the normal-
ized Hilbert space vectors
ψa = (1, 0)
ψA = (0, 1)
ψb = (1/2,
√
3/2)
ψB = (
√
3/2,−1/2)
ψc = (1/2,−
√
3/2)
ψC = (
√
3/2, 1/2) (13)
or, equivalently, the rank 1 density operators
σa =
(
1 0
0 0
)
σA =
(
0 0
0 1
)
σb =
(
1
4
1
4
√
3
1
4
√
3 34
)
σB =
(
3
4 − 14
√
3
− 14
√
3 14
)
σc =
(
1
4 − 14
√
3
− 14
√
3 34
)
σC =
(
3
4
1
4
√
3
1
4
√
3 14
)
(14)
One can easily verify the following orthogonality condi-
tions
σaσA = 0, (15)
σbσB = 0, (16)
σcσC = 0. (17)
Now consider the preparation procedure wherein one of
Pa or PA is implemented, with the choice being made uni-
formly at random (for instance, by flipping a fair coin),
and with no record being made of the choice. Denote this
procedure by PaA. Define procedures PbB and PcC sim-
ilarly. Consider also the preparation procedure wherein
one of Pa, Pb, or PC is implemented, again, with equal
probabilities for each, and without recording the choice.
We denote this by Pabc. The procedure PABC is defined
similarly.
These procedures are represented in the quantum for-
malism by the appropriate convex sums of the density
operators in Eq. (14). It turns out that all of these con-
vex sums yield the same rank-2 density operator, namely,
I/2 =
(
1
2 0
0 12
)
, (18)
commonly referred to as the ‘completely mixed state’.
Specifically,
I/2 =
1
2
σa +
1
2
σA (19)
=
1
2
σb +
1
2
σB (20)
=
1
2
σc +
1
2
σC (21)
=
1
3
σa +
1
3
σb +
1
3
σc (22)
=
1
3
σA +
1
3
σB +
1
3
σC . (23)
In figure 1, we present the Bloch ball representation
of the seven density operators defined above. This pro-
vides a graphical synopsis of the relevant orthogonality
relations and convex structure.
σa
σb
σA
σc
σCσB
I/2
FIG. 1: The Bloch ball representation of the six pure states
and the five convex decompositions of the completely mixed
state used in the proof of preparation contextuality. Each
convex decomposition is represented by a convex polytope
whose vertices represent the elements of the decomposition
[18]. The 2-element decompositions in our example are rep-
resented by line segments, and the 3-element decompositions
by equilateral triangles.
Within an ontological model of operational quantum
theory, each preparation procedure Px is associated with
a probability distribution µx(λ). Now note that if two
density operators, σ and σ′, are orthogonal in the vector
8space of operators, that is, σσ′ = 0, then the associ-
ated preparation procedures can be distinguished with
certainty in a single-shot measurement (for instance, for
preparations associated with orthogonal Hilbert space
vectors, one simply implements the measurement asso-
ciated with an orthogonal basis that includes these vec-
tors). By feature 1 of ontological models (described
above), distinguishable procedures are represented by
nonoverlapping distributions. Thus, from Eqs. (15)-(17)
we can infer that
µa(λ)µA(λ) = 0, (24)
µb(λ)µB(λ) = 0, (25)
µc(λ)µC(λ) = 0. (26)
Furthermore, in any ontological model a convex
combination of preparation procedures is represented
by a convex sum of the associated probability dis-
tributions (feature 2 above). Thus, if the proce-
dures PaA,PbB, . . . ,PABC are represented by distribu-
tions µaA(λ), µbB(λ), . . . , µABC(λ), the manner in which
these procedures are obtained by convex combination of
Pa,Pb, . . . ,PC implies that
µaA(λ) =
1
2
µa(λ) +
1
2
µA(λ) (27)
µbB(λ) =
1
2
µb(λ) +
1
2
µB(λ) (28)
µcC(λ) =
1
2
µc(λ) +
1
2
µC(λ) (29)
µabc(λ) =
1
3
µa(λ) +
1
3
µb(λ) +
1
3
µc(λ) (30)
µABC(λ) =
1
3
µA(λ) +
1
3
µB(λ) +
1
3
µC(λ). (31)
The assumption of a preparation noncontextual onto-
logical model is that the distribution associated with a
preparation procedure depends only on the operational
equivalence class of that procedure, and thus only on the
density operator associated with that procedure. Since
the procedures PaA,PbB, . . . ,PABC are all represented
by I/2, they must all be represented by the same distri-
bution in a preparation noncontextual ontological model.
Thus, we require µaA = µbB = · · · = µABC . Denoting
this distribution by ν(λ), we have simply
ν(λ) =
1
2
µa(λ) +
1
2
µA(λ) (32)
=
1
2
µb(λ) +
1
2
µB(λ) (33)
=
1
2
µc(λ) +
1
2
µC(λ) (34)
=
1
3
µa(λ) +
1
3
µb(λ) +
1
3
µc(λ) (35)
=
1
3
µA(λ) +
1
3
µB(λ) +
1
3
µC(λ). (36)
We now show that there is no set of distributions sat-
isfying Eqs. (24)-(26) and Eqs. (32)-(36). Consider the
values of the various probability densities at a fixed value
of λ. We denote these simply as µa, µA, . . . , µC .We show
that the only solution to all the constraints, for a fixed λ,
is µa, µA, . . . , µC = 0, which we call the all-zero solution.
To satisfy Eqs. (24)-(26), one of the pair µa and µA
must be zero, as must be one of the pair µb and µB and
one of the pair µc and µC . In all, there are eight possible
assignments of zeroes that satisfy Eqs. (24)-(26). We
consider each of these in turn.
If we have µa, µb, µc = 0 then by Eq. (35) we have ν =
0, and by Eqs. (32)-(34), we conclude that µA, µB, µC =
0, so that we have the all-zero solution. If, instead we
have µa, µb, µC = 0 then by combining Eq. (34) and Eq.
(35) we find 12µc =
1
3µc, for which the only solution is
µc = 0. But this gets us back to the first case, and the
all-zero solution. Every other case yields the all-zero so-
lution by virtue of the symmetry of the problem under
rotations by multiples of 60 degrees in the Bloch sphere
representation.
The above argument did not depend on λ, and thus
for all λ the only solution is the all-zero solution. Con-
sequently, the only set of distributions that satisfy Eqs.
(24)-(26) and Eqs. (32)-(36) is the set of uniformly zero
distributions, µa(λ), µA(λ), · · · , µC(λ) = 0. But such
distributions are not probability distributions since they
are not normalized to one. This concludes the proof.
I am grateful to Terry Rudolph for having improved
upon my original proof of preparation contextuality by
proposing the highly symmetric example presented here.
V. PROOFS OF CONTEXTUALITY FOR
UNSHARP MEASUREMENTS IN 2D
Proofs of measurement contextuality have usually
arisen only in the context of sharp measurements, that is,
those associated with PVMs7, and outcome determinism
has been assumed for such measurements. We shall make
the same assumption here for sharp measurements, but
we shall be considering unsharp measurements as well,
that is, those associated with POVMs, and for these, out-
come determinism will not be assumed. It is important to
note that the “proofs of contextuality” presented in the
next two subsections are contingent on the assumption of
outcome determinism for sharp measurements. The sta-
tus of this assumption will be revisited in section VIII,
where we will clarify what, precisely, has been proven.
A. A proof based on a finite set of measurements
Consider three binary-outcome measurements,
Ma,Mb, and Mc, associated respectively with PVMs
{Pa, PA}, {Pb, PB} and {Pc, PC}, where Pa projects
7 Exceptions are Refs. [4, 17, 19]
9onto the ray spanned by ψa, PA projects onto the ray
spanned by ψA, and so forth, with the vectors ψx being
those that are defined in Eq. (13)8.
By the definition of a PVM, we have
Pa + PA = I, (37)
Pb + PB = I, (38)
Pc + PC = I, (39)
and
PaPA = 0, (40)
PbPB = 0, (41)
PcPC = 0. (42)
Given the assumption of outcome determinism for
sharp measurements, the representations of Ma,Mb, and
Mc in an ontological model are the sets of idempotent
indicator functions {χa(λ), χA(λ)}, {χb(λ), χB(λ)}, and
{χc(λ), χC(λ)} respectively. By definition, these must
satisfy
χa(λ) + χA(λ) = 1, (43)
χb(λ) + χB(λ) = 1, (44)
χc(λ) + χC(λ) = 1, (45)
and
χa(λ)χA(λ) = 0, (46)
χb(λ)χB(λ) = 0, (47)
χc(λ)χC(λ) = 0. (48)
Now consider choosing one of Ma,Mb, and Mc at ran-
dom, with probability 1/3 for each, implementing the
chosen measurement, and only registering whether the
first (small letter) or the second (capital letter) outcome
occurred. Call the effective measurement procedure that
results M. It is associated with the POVM
{ 13Pa + 13Pb + 13Pc, 13PA + 13PB + 13PC}. (49)
In an ontological model, a convex combination of mea-
surements procedures is represented by an element-wise
convex sum of the associated sets of indicator functions
(for the same reason that an ontological model has fea-
ture 2 of section IV). Thus, M is represented by the set
of indicator functions
{ 13χa(λ) + 13χb(λ) + 13χc(λ),
1
3χA(λ) +
1
3χB(λ) +
1
3χC(λ)}. (50)
8 Note that Pa = σa, PA = σA, etcetera, where σx is defined in
Eq. (14). This follows from the fact that the rank-1 density op-
erator associated with a vector is simply the projector onto the
ray spanned by that vector. It follows that Eqs. (37)-(39) and
Eqs. (40)-(42) are equivalent to Eqs. (19)-(21) and Eqs. (15)-(17)
respectively. We use a distinct notation for the same mathemati-
cal operators to remind the reader of the fact that in this section
they represent measurement outcomes rather than preparation
procedures.
Note that the POVM (49) is equal to9
{ 12I, 12I}. (51)
But it is clear from this way of writing the POVM that
the measurement has a random outcome regardless of the
preparation procedure, since Tr(ρ 12I) =
1
2 regardless of ρ.
It then follows that the equivalence class of measurement
procedures that contains M also contains the ”measure-
ment” procedure M˜ that completely ignores the system
and just flips a fair coin to determine the outcome. Now
consider how the measurement M˜ is represented in the
ontological model. Because the outcome doesn’t depend
on the system at all, it follows that regardless of the value
of λ, there is a probability of 1/2 for each outcome, so it
is represented by the set of indicator functions
{ 12 , 12}, (52)
where each element should be thought of as a uniform
function over λ of height 12
10.
By the assumption of measurement noncontextuality,
the measurement M must be represented by the same set
of indicator functions as the measurement M˜. It follows
that the set of functions (50) must be equal to the set of
functions (52). However, this constraint is inconsistent
with the constraints (43)-(48). To satisfy Eqs. (43)-(48)
it is necessary that for every value of λ, one of χa(λ)
and χA(λ) must be equal to 0 and the other equal to
1. The same is true of χb(λ) and χB(λ) and of χc(λ)
and χC(λ). The eight possible assignments of values to
these six quantities leave the set of functions (50) with
the values {0, 1}, {1, 0}, { 23 , 13} or { 13 , 23} but never { 12 , 12}.
This concludes the proof.
B. A proof based on the 2D version of Gleason’s
theorem
The impossibility of noncontextuality for unsharp mea-
surements and outcome determinism for sharp measure-
ments can also be established in a 2d Hilbert space by
making appeal to a recent Gleason-like derivation of the
quantum probability rule by Busch [5] and by Caves et al.
[6]. This “generalized Gleason’s theorem” starts from the
assumption that there exists a probability measure that
9 This fact is also captured by Eqs. (22) and (23).
10 This fact can also be established by noting that the equivalence
class includes the measurement M′, obtained from M by per-
muting the two outcomes (because such a permutation does not
change the statistics of outcomes). The ontological representa-
tions of M and M′ are {ξ1(λ), ξ2(λ)} and {ξ2(λ), ξ1(λ)}. Now,
the assumption of measurement noncontextuality implies that
since M and M′ are in the same equivalence class, they must be
represented by the same set of indicator functions. Thus we re-
quire that ξ1(λ) = ξ2(λ). But since ξ1(λ) + ξ2(λ) = 1, it follows
that ξ1(λ) = ξ2(λ) = 1/2 for all λ.
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assigns a unique probability w(E) to every positive oper-
ator E such that w(I) = 1, and whenever a set of positive
operators forms a resolution of identity,
∑
k Ek = I, the
associated probabilities sum to 1,
∑
k w(Ek) = 1. From
these assumptions, it is proven that the measure must
satisfy w(E) = Tr(ρE) for some density operator ρ [5, 6].
Recall that the values of a set of indicator functions
{ξk(λ)} at a particular value of λ form a probability dis-
tribution over k. In a measurement noncontextual the-
ory, every positive operator E is represented by a unique
indicator function ξE(λ), with the identity operator be-
ing represented by the unit function. Moreover, whenever
a set of positive operators forms a resolution of identity,∑
k Ek = I, the associated indicator functions sum to the
unit function,
∑
k ξEk(λ) = 1. Thus, the set of all indica-
tor functions for a given value of λ in an ontological model
satisfy the assumptions of the set of probability measures
in the generalized Gleason’s theorem. It follows therefore
that for every value of λ in the ontological model, there
is a density operator ρλ such that ξE(λ) = Tr(ρλE).
If in addition to measurement noncontextuality, one
assumes outcome determinism for sharp measurements,
then every projector is represented by a unique idem-
potent indicator function χP (λ), and by the generalized
Gleason’s theorem,
χP (λ) = Tr(ρλP ). (53)
Suppose that P = |ψ〉 〈ψ|, and consider a λ such
that χP (λ) = 1. In this case, Eq. (53) implies that
ρλ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|. But then for some other projector P ′ =
|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|, where 0 < |〈ψ|ψ′〉|2 < 1, we have for this
value of λ that χP ′ = Tr(ρλP
′) = |〈ψ|ψ′〉|2 and con-
sequently 0 < χP ′(λ) < 1, which implies that χP ′(λ) is
not idempotent. Thus, the assumption of noncontextual-
ity for unsharp measurements and outcome determinism
for sharp measurements yields a contradiction in a 2d
Hilbert space.
This no-go theorem is related to the no-go theorem
of the previous section in the same way that the no-go
theorem [1] that is obtained from the standard Gleason’s
theorem [7] is related to the original Kochen-Specker the-
orem [2]. The former derive a contradiction using the full
set of measurements, while the latter only make use of a
finite set.
VI. PROOF OF TRANSFORMATION
CONTEXTUALITY IN 2D
Consider a set of six transformation procedures, de-
noted T0,Tpi/3,T2pi/3,Tpi ,T4pi/3,T5pi/3, where the proce-
dure Tθ corresponds to the CP map
Tθ(ρ) = Uy,θρU †y,θ, (54)
and where
Uy,θ =
(
cos θ2 − sin θ2
sin θ2 cos
θ
2
)
(55)
is the unitary operator describing a rotation by θ about
the y axis in the Bloch sphere. Consider also the CP map
T that takes all points in the Bloch sphere and projects
them onto the y axis. There are many ways of implement-
ing T as a convex sum of transformations, specifically,
T = 1
2
T0 + 1
2
Tpi (56)
=
1
2
Tpi/3 + 1
2
T4pi/3 (57)
=
1
2
T2pi/3 + 1
2
T5pi/3 (58)
=
1
3
T0 + 1
3
T2pi/3 +
1
3
T4pi/3 (59)
=
1
3
Tpi/3 + 1
3
Tpi + 1
3
T5pi/3 (60)
These identities can be explained as follows. The map T
can be achieved by performing with probability 1/2 a ro-
tation in the Bloch sphere about the y axis by θ and with
probability 1/2 a rotation by θ + pi. Taking θ = 0, pi/3
and 2pi/3 yields Eqs. (56)-(58). The map T can also
be achieved by performing a rotation about y by θ, by
θ+2pi/3 or by θ+4pi/3 with equal probabilities. Taking
θ = 0 and pi/3 yields Eqs. (59) and (60). A rigorous proof
of these statements is provided in the appendix.
By the assumption of transformation noncontextual-
ity each of the seven CP maps we have considered is
associated with a unique transition matrix on the space
of ontic states. Suppose that we denote the transition
matrix associated with T by Γ, and the transition ma-
trix associated with Tθ by Γθ. Because a convex sum of
transformation procedures is represented in an ontolog-
ical model by a convex sum of the associated transition
matrices, Eqs. (56)-(60) imply
Γ =
1
2
Γ0 +
1
2
Γpi (61)
=
1
2
Γpi/3 +
1
2
Γ4pi/3 (62)
=
1
2
Γ2pi/3 +
1
2
Γ5pi/3 (63)
=
1
3
Γ0 +
1
3
Γ2pi/3 +
1
3
Γ4pi/3 (64)
=
1
3
Γpi/3 +
1
3
Γpi +
1
3
Γ5pi/3 (65)
Note that Tθ and Tθ+pi take any rank-1 density op-
erator lying in the z-x plane of the Bloch sphere to a
pair of orthogonal density operators. Since these are dis-
tinguishable with certainty, it follows from feature 1 of
ontological models (see section IV) that the transition
matrices Γθ and Γθ+pi must take any distribution µx(λ)
to disjoint distributions, that is,∫
dλ′ Γθ(λ, λ′) µx(λ′)
∫
dλ′ Γθ+pi(λ, λ′) µx(λ′) = 0.
(66)
Now consider how our seven transition matrices af-
fect the distribution µa(λ) associated with the density
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operator σa, defined in Eq. (14) (recall that σa is rep-
resented on the Bloch sphere by the vector pointing
along the z axis). We obtain seven distinct distribu-
tions, which we denote µθ(λ) ≡
∫
dλ′ Γθ(λ, λ′) µx(λ′),
for θ = 0, pi/3, 2pi/3, pi, 4pi/3, 5pi/3, and µ(λ) ≡∫
dλ′ Γ(λ, λ′) µx(λ′). By virtue of Eqs. (61)-(65) and Eq.
(66), these seven distributions satisfy Eqs. (32)-(36) and
Eqs. (24)-(26) where a,A, b, B, c, C are associated with
θ = 0, pi, 2pi/3, 5pi/3, 4pi/3, pi/3 respectively. But Eqs.
(32)-(36) and Eqs. (24)-(26) cannot be satisfied simul-
taneously, so we have arrived at a contradiction11.
In a draft of this article, the question of the existence of
a no-go theorem for transformation noncontextuality was
left as an open problem. The question was resolved by
Terry Rudolph who provided the example given above. I
am grateful for his permission to present the result here.
VII. IS THE ASSUMPTION OF
NONCONTEXTUALITY NATURAL?
An important question is whether the assumption of
noncontextuality for preparations, transformations, and
unsharp measurements is as well motivated as this same
assumption for sharp measurements, to which the notion
is usually restricted. To answer this, one must consider
the motivation for the latter, which seems to be one of
ontological economy: be wary of introducing differences
in the ontological explanations of empirical phenomena
where there are no differences in the phenomena them-
selves. Einstein’s equivalence principle is an example of a
fruitful application of this principle. If this is indeed the
motivation, then it clearly also applies to our generalized
notions of noncontextuality. Specifically, if one believes
that equivalent statistics suggest equivalent ontological
representations for sharp measurements, why should one
not believe this for preparations, transformations, and
unsharp measurements as well? Thus, barring an alter-
native motivation for the traditional notion of noncontex-
tuality, it seems that an ontological model that respects
the statistical equivalence class structure of preparations,
transformations, and unsharp measurements is as well (or
badly) motivated as an ontological model that respects
the statistical equivalence class structure of sharp mea-
surements.
This of course leaves open the question of whether any
assumption of noncontextuality is natural. The answer
seems to depend on one’s interpretational bent. John
Bell, for instance, thought that contextuality was not at
all surprising12, whereas David Mermin has characterized
11 It should be noted that the above argument is equivalent to
a proof of preparation contextuality in four dimensions if one
makes use of the Jamiolkowski isomorphism between density op-
erators in a 4d space and CP maps in a 2d space [20].
12 Bell states: “The result of an observation may reasonably depend
not only on the state of the system (including hidden variables)
it as a mystery in need of explanation13.
In order to defend the view that measurement contex-
tuality is indeed mysterious within the framework of an
ontological model, we show that the reasons for thinking
so are very similar to the reasons for thinking that non-
locality is mysterious. Disregarding classical prejudice,
nonlocality is not an unreasonable assumption. How-
ever, if the universe is fundamentally nonseparable or is
such that causal influences can propagate faster than the
speed of light, then why should it also be the case that
one cannot use these effects to achieve super-luminal sig-
nalling? Given the presence of nonlocality at the on-
tological level, it seems almost conspiratorial that one
cannot make use of this nonlocality for signalling. Simi-
larly, it is certainly not unreasonable for the statistics of
experimental outcomes for a given ontic state to depend
on details of the experimental procedure. But assum-
ing this to be the case, it is very surprising that when
one considers any valid probability distribution over the
ontic states (that is, any distribution that characterizes
what someone who knows only the preparation procedure
knows about the ontic state), the weighted average over
the statistics of outcomes does not depend on the details
of the experimental procedure. Again, this seems almost
conspiratorial. This analogy suggests that removing the
appearance of conspiracy from contextuality may well be
on a par with reconciling Bell’s theorem and relativity as
a guide for progress in the search for a wholly satisfactory
realist interpretation of quantum theory.
It is likely that the notion of preparation noncontex-
tuality will also seem natural to some and unnatural to
others. To shed some light on the diversity of reactions, it
is useful to distinguish two different types of ontological
model of quantum theory. Specifically, we distinguish
what we call the epistemic view and the ontic view of
quantum states [25].
The epistemic view of quantum states asserts that a
density operator represents nothing more than an agent’s
knowledge about the ontic state of the system. Specifi-
cally, it represents the knowledge of someone who knows
only the preparation procedure. In this view, the on-
tic state of a system does not fix the density operator
that is used to describe it. Distinct non-orthogonal den-
sity operators (including the pure cases) are represented
by overlapping probability distributions within this view
and are thus consistent with a single ontic state. By con-
trast, the ontic view of quantum states asserts that the
density operator itself represents an attribute of the sys-
tem, and consequently that two distinct density opera-
tors represent mutually exclusive physical states of affairs
but also on the complete disposition of the apparatus.” [1]
13 Mermin states: “if one is attempting a hidden variable model at
all, it seems not unreasonable to expect the model to provide the
obvious explanation for this striking insensitivity of the distribu-
tion to changes in the experimental arrangement — namely, that
the hidden variables are noncontextual” [21]
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and are therefore represented in the ontological model by
nonoverlapping (i.e. disjoint) probability distributions.
To be precise, for a set S of density operators (assumed
to contain some nonorthogonal elements), an ontological
model adopts an ontic view of S if all distinct elements
of S are represented by disjoint distributions, that is,
ρ 6= ρ′ implies µρ(λ)µρ′ (λ) = 0 for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ S, (67)
whereas an ontological model adopts an epistemic view
of S if only orthogonal elements of S are represented by
disjoint distributions
µρ(λ)µρ′ (λ) = 0 only if ρρ
′ = 0, for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ S (68)
In other words, in an epistemic view of S, being orthogo-
nal is a necessary condition for a pair of quantum states
to be represented by disjoint distributions (the argument
presented at the beginning of section IV shows that or-
thogonality is a sufficient condition for disjointness, re-
gardless of whether one adopts an ontic or an epistemic
view.)
We now show that an ontic view of the set of pure
quantum states rules out the possibility of preparation
noncontextuality trivially. Our purpose here is to show
that an implicit commitment to such a view can lead to
the impression that the assumption of preparation non-
contextuality is unnatural.
Consider the four preparation procedures Pa,PA,Pb
and PB from section IV, represented in quantum theory
by the Hilbert space vectors ψa, ψA, ψb and ψB respec-
tively. An ontic view of pure quantum states implies
that not only are the orthogonal states associated with
disjoint distributions,
µa(λ)µA(λ) = 0 (69)
µb(λ)µB(λ) = 0, (70)
but also nonorthogonal states are associated with disjoint
distributions,
µa(λ)µb(λ) = 0 (71)
µA(λ)µb(λ) = 0 (72)
µa(λ)µB(λ) = 0 (73)
µA(λ)µB(λ) = 0 (74)
(75)
It is then clear that the preparation procedures PaA and
PbB, obtained respectively by implementing Pa and PA
with equal probability, or Pb and PB with equal probabil-
ity, are represented by distributions µaA and µbB (defined
in Eqs. (27) and (28)) that are also disjoint,
µaA(λ)µbB(λ) = 0. (76)
However, since these two procedures are represented by
the same density operator, namely I/2, they must be
represented by the same distribution in a preparation
noncontextual model. Thus, an ontic view of quantum
states trivially precludes the possibility of preparation
noncontextuality.
Since our manner of speaking about pure quantum
states typically favors the ontic view of the latter, it
also tends to make the assumption of preparation non-
contextuality seem implausible. The very term “quan-
tum state” already predisposes one to thinking of the
density operator as representing the physical state of af-
fairs rather than an agent’s knowledge. For instance, in
the context of photon polarization, the multiplicity of
convex decompositions of the completely mixed state is
sometimes summarized as follows: “an equal mixture of
states of horizontal and vertical polarization is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from an equal mixture of states
of left and right circular polarization”. Implicit in this
sort of language is the assumption that the four different
states of polarization are mutually exclusive states of af-
fairs and are therefore ontic states. Indeed, this way of
putting things compels us to question (in vain) whether
there isn’t really some measurement that could tell these
two cases apart. However, it is wrong to take this as an
argument against the “naturalness” of preparation non-
contextuality because this impression can be attributed
entirely to the language that is used to describe the phe-
nomenon.
If one is to take the epistemic view seriously, as one
should in an investigation of the possibility of an onto-
logical model of quantum theory, then this sort of lan-
guage must be avoided, and the assumption of prepa-
ration noncontextuality is a priori very plausible. In-
deed, in light of the arguments that have recently been
made in favor of the epistemic view of quantum states
[22, 23, 24, 25] and the fact that one can reproduce
qualitatively many quantum phenomena in noncontex-
tual theories [25, 26, 27, 28], the impossibility of a prepa-
ration noncontextual ontological model appears all the
more shocking to the devoted realist.
VIII. THE ISSUE OF OUTCOME
DETERMINISM
In our proof of contextuality for unsharp measure-
ments, we assumed outcome determinism for sharp mea-
surements but we assumed outcome indeterminism for
unsharp measurements. This amounts to representing
all and only those POVMs with idempotent elements by
sets of indicator functions that are idempotent. Although
this seems like a natural assumption to make, two alter-
native assumptions might seem a priori worth consid-
ering: (1) that both sharp and unsharp measurements
are outcome-deterministic, or (2) that both are outcome-
indeterministic.
We begin by considering the first alternative, that out-
come determinism also holds for unsharp measurements.
It turns out that this is trivially inconsistent with assum-
ing measurement noncontextuality. Consider a measure-
ment procedure M associated with the POVM {I/2, I/2}.
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As argued in section V, the assumption of measurement
noncontextuality implies that M must be represented in
an ontological model by the set of indicator functions
{1/2, 1/2} which are not idempotent, and thus M can-
not be outcome deterministic. A recent result by Ca-
bello [4] also rules out the possibility of a hidden variable
model that is measurement noncontextual and outcome
deterministic for unsharp measurements. However, this
proof is unnecessarily complex since a consideration of
the POVM {I/2, I/2} yields the result immediately.
The second alternative is that both sharp and unsharp
measurements are outcome-indeterministic. This is the
more significant alternative, because it constitutes the
weakest assumption and consequently the most general
framework for an ontological model. Indeed, unless the
assumption of outcome determinism can itself be justi-
fied by the assumption of noncontextuality, it is inappro-
priate to call any no-go theorem that makes use of this
assumption a proof of contextuality, because in the face
of a contradiction one can always assume that the faulty
assumption was that of outcome determinism rather than
that of measurement noncontextuality. Thus, neither the
proof of Bell [1], nor the proof of Kochen and Specker
[2], nor any of the proofs of these types including those
presented in section V, serve to rule out the possibility
of measurement noncontextuality (in the sense in which
we have defined the term). It turns out, however, that
the assumption of outcome determinism for sharp mea-
surements can be justified by an assumption of prepara-
tion noncontextuality, as we shall presently demonstrate.
Given this inference, the old proofs are vindicated inso-
far as they remain proofs of the impossibility of universal
noncontextuality (noncontextuality for all experimental
procedures).
It should be noted that Toner, Bacon, and Ben-Or [19]
have considered a third alternative, namely, that outcome
determinism holds for just those POVMs with elements
that are not repeatable, that is, elements that cannot
appear twice in a single POVM, and have obtained a
nontrivial no-go theorem. Bacciagaluppi [17] has consid-
ered a similar alternative and obtained a similar result.
Although this is a much weaker assumption than the first
alternative, the resulting theorems are still not proofs of
the impossibility of universal noncontextuality, according
to our definition, since the assumption of outcome deter-
minism for these special POVMs has not been justified
by an assumption of universal noncontextuality. In con-
trast, outcome determinism for all sharp measurements
can be so justified. We turn now to the proof of this
statement.
A. Preparation noncontextuality implies outcome
determinism for sharp measurements
Consider a rank-1 PVM {Pk}. Thinking of each of the
elements as a rank-1 density operator, ρk = Pk, we ob-
tain an orthogonal set of rank-1 density operators {ρk}.
We denote the density operators and projectors differ-
ently because they are represented differently in the on-
tological model. The set {ρk} is represented by a set
of probability densities {µk(λ)}, while the PVM {Pk} is
represented by a set of indicator functions {ξk(λ)}. Since
the ρk are orthogonal, the associated preparations are
distinguishable with certainty, and thus by feature 1 of
ontological models we must have
µk(λ)µk′ (λ) = δk,k′ . (77)
The support of µk(λ), denoted Ωk, is the region of the
ontic state space assigned non-zero probability by µk(λ),
Ωk = {λ|µk(λ) > 0}. (78)
Eq. (77) then implies that
Ωk ∩Ωk′ = ∅ if k 6= k′. (79)
Now, by virtue of the fact that
Tr(ρkPk′ ) = δk,k′ , (80)
we infer that ∫
ξk(λ)µk′ (λ) = δk,k′ . (81)
But, given Eq. (78), this implies that
ξk(λ) =
1 for λ ∈ Ωk
0 for λ ∈ ∪k′ 6=kΩk′ , (82)
or, equivalently,
ξk(λ)ξk′ (λ) = δk,k′ for λ ∈ ∪jΩj . (83)
So, if one can show that the union of the supports of the
µk(λ) is the entire ontic state space, i.e.,
∪jΩj = Ω, (84)
then Eq. (83) would imply that {ξk(λ)} is a set of idempo-
tent indicator functions, and consequently would estab-
lish that our rank-1 PVM must be outcome-deterministic
in the ontological model.
It turns out that Eq. (84) follows from the assumption
of preparation noncontextuality. First note that the ontic
state space Ω can be defined as the set of λ that are
assigned non-zero probability by some density operator
Ω = {λ|µρ(λ) > 0 for some ρ} . (85)
However, since every density operator ρ appears in some
convex decomposition of the completely mixed state I/d
(where d is the dimensionality of the Hilbert space), and
since preparation noncontextuality implies that there is
a unique distribution µI/d(λ) associated with this state,
it follows that Ω is simply the set of λ assigned non-zero
probability by the latter, i.e.,
Ω =
{
λ|µI/d(λ) > 0
}
. (86)
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But given that the ρk form a convex decomposition of
I/d,
∑
k
1
d
ρk =
I
d
, (87)
it follows from preparation noncontextuality that
∑
k
1
d
µk(λ) = µI/d(λ), (88)
which implies Eq. (84).
This establishes outcome determinism for PVMs all of
whose elements are rank 1. Since an arbitrary PVM can
always be obtained by coarse-graining of a rank-1 PVM,
and since coarse-graining takes idempotent functions to
idempotent functions, any PVM is represented by a set of
idempotent indicator functions. This establishes that the
assumption of outcome determinism for sharp measure-
ments follows from an assumption of preparation non-
contextuality.
It is natural to wonder whether outcome determinism
for sharp measurements might be justified by an assump-
tion of measurement noncontextuality (rather than an as-
sumption of preparation noncontextuality). If this were
possible, then the proofs in section V would derive con-
tradictions from measurement noncontextuality alone. It
turns out that this is not possible, because measurement
noncontextuality on its own is consistent with quantum
theory, as we now show.
B. Achieving measurement noncontextuality by
giving up outcome determinism
Consider the following ontological model of quantum
theory, which is objectively indeterministic and adopts
an ontic view of quantum states. The ontic state space
Ω is simply taken to be the projective Hilbert space, that
is, the set of rays of Hilbert space. Thus, for every rank-1
projector |ψ〉 〈ψ| , we associate a single ontic state, which
we denote by ψ. Consequently, there are no hidden vari-
ables in this ontological model. A preparation procedure
associated with the rank-1 density operator |ψ′〉 〈ψ′| is
represented by a Dirac-delta distribution
µψ′(ψ) = δ(ψ − ψ′). (89)
A preparation procedure involving a convex combina-
tion of rank-1 density operators {p(ψ′), |ψ′〉 〈ψ′|} is rep-
resented by the distribution
µ(ψ) =
∫
dψ′p(ψ′)δ(ψ − ψ′), (90)
where dψ is the unitarily-invariant measure on the pro-
jective Hilbert space. A measurement of the POVM {Qk}
is associated with a set of indicator functions {ξQk(λ)}
defined by
ξQk(ψ) = Tr(Qk |ψ〉 〈ψ|). (91)
These functions are clearly positive by virtue of the pos-
itivity of the Qk, and sum to unity by virtue of the fact
that
∑
k Qk = I. Note also that they depend only on the
POVM that is associated with the measurement and not
on how it was implemented. One can see that this model
reproduces quantum theory by noting that∫
µψ′(ψ)ξQk(ψ)dψ = Tr(Qk |ψ′〉 〈ψ′|). (92)
The predictions for mixed preparations are also repro-
duced.
This model has been discussed at length by Beltram-
etti and Bugajski [8], and captures to some extent the
ontological model that many physicists implicitly adhere
to. Note that the model is obviously preparation con-
textual since the distribution that represents a convex
combination of preparation procedures, described in Eq.
(90), depends on the particular ensemble of pure states,
and not just on the density operator associated with the
mixture. This fact comes as no surprise since the results
of section IV show that any ontological model, deter-
ministic or not, must be preparation contextual. More
importantly for the purposes of this section, the set of
indicator functions associated with any PVM {Pk} are
not idempotent. This is clear since Tr(Pk |ψ〉 〈ψ|) is only
0 or 1 if |ψ〉 lies in an eigenspace of Pk. It follows that
the assumption of outcome determinism for sharp mea-
surements is explicitly violated. However, because the
set of indicator functions depends only on the POVM,
and not on its context, the assumption of measurement
noncontextuality is upheld.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Because the traditional notion of noncontextuality
only allowed for a no-go theorem in Hilbert spaces of
dimensionality greater than two, there have been many
proposed hidden variable models for 2d Hilbert spaces
that are purported to be noncontextual [1, 2]. These
have been presented primarily as pedagogical examples
of what sort of model is excluded for larger-dimensional
Hilbert spaces. However, by our generalized definition
of noncontextuality, all of these models are deemed con-
textual by virtue of being contextual for preparations,
transformations, and unsharp measurements. This over-
turns the notion, suggested by the restriction of old Bell-
Kochen-Specker theorems to Hilbert spaces of dimension-
ality greater than two, that there is nothing inherently
nonclassical about a 2d Hilbert space [29].
In the face of this claim, a sceptic might argue that
the proofs presented here have made use of mixed prepa-
rations, unsharp measurements, and irreversible trans-
formations (associated respectively with non-rank-1 den-
sity operators, non-projective POVMs, and non-unitary
CP maps), and that these are necessarily implemented
in practice through pure preparations, sharp measure-
ments, and reversible transformations (associated respec-
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tively with rank-1 density operators, PVMs, and unitary
maps) on a larger system and therefore implicitly make
use of a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two.
However, this is incorrect. If one examines carefully the
proofs presented in this article, one finds that wherever
non-rank-1 density operators, non-projective POVMs, or
non-unitary CP maps arise, they are due to ignorance of
which of several rank-1 density operators, PVMs, or uni-
tary maps in the 2d Hilbert space is appropriate, rather
than being due to the neglect of a subspace or subsystem
of a larger dimensional Hilbert space. In other words,
any “ancillary” systems used to implement such proce-
dures can be treated classically, and thus do not require
one to posit a larger Hilbert space.
Our operational definition of noncontextuality has al-
lowed us to distinguish the notions of preparation, trans-
formation, and measurement noncontextuality. Our
proof of preparation contextuality is particularly novel as
a no-go theorem insofar as it focusses on the impossibil-
ity of reproducing, within a particular kind of ontological
model, the convex structure of the set of quantum states
rather than the algebraic structure of the set of quantum
measurements. It is interesting to note that wherever
one finds a freedom of decomposition in the formalism
of operational quantum theory, such as the multiplicity
of convex decompositions of a mixed quantum state or
of a POVM element, the multiplicity of fine-grainings
of a non-rank-1 POVM, or the unitary freedom in the
operator-sum representation of a non-unitary CP map,
one can develop a proof of contextuality that is based on
this freedom.
We have shown that one can confine all the contextual-
ity into the preparations and transformations if one likes,
because there exist outcome-indeterministic ontological
models of quantum theory, such as the Beltrametti-
Bugajski model, that are measurement noncontextual.
On the other hand, one cannot confine all the contex-
tuality into the measurements, because the assumption
of preparation noncontextuality yields a contradiction on
its own. In this sense, preparation contextuality is more
fundamental to quantum theory than measurement con-
textuality.
The issue of noncontextuality is closely linked with the
issue of locality. Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that
nonlocality is an instance of measurement contextuality.
If this were the case, then proofs of nonlocality would
also constitute proofs of measurement contextuality, and
since there exist proofs of nonlocality that do not assume
outcome determinism for sharp measurements, it would
appear that there should exist proofs of measurement
contextuality that do not make this assumption either.
But this would be in contradiction with the claims of the
previous section.
The resolution of this puzzle is that one can distin-
guish two sorts of locality [30], and it is only the failure
of one of these that implies measurement contextuality.
The first notion of locality, which we call separability,
is the assumption that the ontic state of the universe
is defined in terms of the ontic states at each point of
space-time. The other sort of locality assumption, which
presumes separability, we call local causality. It is the
assumption that the probability distribution over values
for a variable in a space-time region are determined by
the values of all the variables in the backward light-cone
of this region (see footnote in section III). A failure of lo-
cal causality within the framework of a separable model
does indeed imply measurement contextuality. However,
a model can be nonlocal by virtue of failing to be separa-
ble, and in this case it does not follow that the model is
measurement contextual. This is precisely what occurs
in the Beltrametti-Bugajski model. The variables for a
composite system are not simply the Cartesian product
of the variables of the components, since the Cartesian
product of two projective Hilbert spaces is not the projec-
tive Hilbert space of the tensor product (it fails to include
the entangled states). In particular, spatially separated
systems are not associated with distinct variables. Thus,
the Beltrametti-Bugajski model is not separable. It is
only within the context of a separable theory that Bell’s
theorem implies measurement contextuality.
The opposite inference has also received a great deal of
attention: whether a proof of measurement contextuality
can be turned into a proof of nonlocality (note that the
question is only interesting if one presumes separability
since otherwise one is already acknowledging a failure of
some sort of locality). The motivation for this investiga-
tion is clear since, as Bell famously emphasized, an as-
sumption of measurement noncontextuality is most com-
pelling if it can be justified by an assumption of locality
[31]. Many authors have shown how certain no-go the-
orems for measurement noncontextuality can be turned
into no-go theorems for locality by virtue of the fact that
sometimes every assumption of measurement noncontex-
tuality in a Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem can be justified
by an assumption of locality [21, 32]. It turns out that the
same trick can be achieved in no-go theorems for prepa-
ration noncontextuality. Although the particular proof
of the no-go theorem presented in section IV does not
admit such a justification, a proof can be found which
does. This will be presented in a separate article [33].
The version of Bell’s theorem that results is particularly
enlightening, as it constitutes a more direct response to
the EPR argument [34] compared to standard versions of
the theorem.
It should be noted that there are contexts that do not
have any representation in the formalism of operational
quantum theory. Whether one uses a piece of polaroid or
a birefringent crystal in a measurement of photon polar-
ization is an example of such a context. No dependence
on this sort of context is implied by any of the no-go
theorems we have presented14. Nonetheless, some hid-
14 If, however, one decides to treat part of the experimental appa-
ratus as a quantum system, then this sort of distinction could
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den variable theories still exhibit such dependence. For
instance, it has been shown that the deBroglie-Bohm
interpretation has this sort of context-dependence for
certain position measurements [35, 36] and for certain
spin measurements [37]. Thus, the deBroglie-Bohm in-
terpretation involves more contextuality than has been
shown to be required of an ontological model. Note that
Refs. [35, 36, 37] explicitly identify this feature of the
deBroglie-Bohm interpretation as a kind of contextual-
ity despite the fact that it does not fit into the standard
definition of contextuality presented in the introduction.
The possibility of this type of phenomenon was in fact
considered in the framework of a general hidden variable
theory much earlier by Shimony [38], who also described
it as a kind of contextuality. This highlights another
virtue of our generalized definition of contextuality: it
accords with the intuition that a measurement context is
any feature of the measurement that is not specified by
specifying its equivalence class.
An operational definition of noncontextuality is also
likely to be useful because it allows one to investigate
the possibility of finding ways of experimentally differ-
entiating the set of noncontextual theories from the set
of contextual theories, much as the Bell inequalities dif-
ferentiate all local realistic theories from their alterna-
tives. If these investigations are successful, they could
shed light on the question of how to perform experimen-
tal tests of contextuality, a subject of much recent inter-
est [39, 40, 41]. The question of whether an experimental
test of contextuality is even possible has been the subject
of some controversy, due to the finite precision of real
experimental procedures [42, 43, 44, 45]. The problem,
from the perspective of this article, is that finite precision
might imply that in practice no two experimental proce-
dures are found to be operationally equivalent, in which
case the assumption of noncontextuality is never applica-
ble. A possible resolution of this finite precision loophole
is to further generalize the definition of noncontextuality
proposed in the introduction as follows:
A noncontextual ontological model of an op-
erational theory is one wherein if two exper-
imental procedures are operationally similar,
then they have similar representations in the
ontological model.
To be substantive, this proposal must be supplemented
by a quantitative measure of similarity in the space of
operational procedures, and a corresponding measure in
the space of ontological representations of these proce-
dures. Whether this strategy can lead to an experimen-
tally robust notion of contextuality is a subject for future
research.
Finally, given the fact that some quantum information
processing protocols, namely, protocols for communica-
tion complexity problems [46], have been proven to re-
quire violations of Bell inequalities in order to outperform
their classical counterparts, it is interesting to investigate
whether the power of any quantum information process-
ing protocols might be attributed to the contextuality of
quantum theory. There is already some evidence to this
effect in the case of random access codes [47]. We specu-
late that this might also be the case for the exponential
speed-up of a quantum computer relative to a classical
computer, if such a speed-up exists.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF EQS. (56)-(60)
To demonstrate Eqs. (56)-(60), we make use of the
fact that there is unitary freedom in the operator-sum
representation of a CP map [48]. Suppose that {Wµ} are
a set of operators (called Kraus operators) appearing in
an operator-sum representation of T , that is,
T (ρ) =
∑
µ
WµρW
†
µ. (A1)
Then, for any unitary matrix uνµ, the set of operators
{Xν} defined by
Xν =
∑
µ
uνµWµ (A2)
also forms an operator-sum representation of T . Note
that we allow Kraus operators to be zero, so that dif-
ferent operator-sum representations may have different
cardinality.
Eq. (56) implies that T has an operator-sum represen-
tation in terms of the set of Kraus operators {W1,W2} =
{ 1√
2
U0,
1√
2
Upi}, since
T (ρ) = 1
2
U0ρU
†
0 +
1
2
UpiρU
†
pi. (A3)
The set of operators {X1, X2} = { 1√2Uθ, 1√2Uθ+pi} also
yield an operator-sum representation of T since they
can be obtained by a unitary remixing of {W1,W2}, via
Eq. (A2), using the 2× 2 unitary matrix
u =
(
cos θ2 sin
θ
2
− sin θ2 cos θ2
)
(A4)
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It follows, in particular, that the sets of Kraus opera-
tors { 1√
2
Upi/3,
1√
2
U4pi/3} and { 1√2U2pi/3, 1√2U5pi/3} form
operator-sum representations of T , and consequently
that Eqs. (57) and (58) hold.
Next, we show that the set of operators {X1, X2, X3} =
{ 1√
3
Uθ,
1√
3
Uθ+2pi/3,
1√
3
Uθ+4pi/3} also yield an operator-
sum representation of T . First note that the set
{W1,W2,W3} = { 1√2U0, 1√2Upi, 0} yields the operator-
sum representation of T associated with Eq. (56). The
operators {X1, X2, X3} can be obtained by a unitary
remixing of {W1,W2,W3} using the 3×3 unitary matrix
u =


√
2
3 cos
θ
2
√
2
3 sin
θ
2
√
1
3√
2
3 cos(
θ
2 +
2pi
3 )
√
2
3 sin(
θ
2 +
2pi
3 )
√
1
3√
2
3 cos(
θ
2 +
4pi
3 )
√
2
3 sin(
θ
2 +
4pi
3 )
√
1
3

 . (A5)
It follows, in particular, that { 1√
3
U0,
1√
3
U2pi/3,
1√
3
U4pi/3}
and { 1√
3
Upi/3,
1√
3
Upi,
1√
3
U5pi/3} form operator-sum repre-
sentations of T and consequently that Eqs. (59) and (60)
hold.
